Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) reshapes and challenges psychological ownership of created content. This article examines how GenAI disrupts original content creators’ and GenAI users’ sense of ownership and control and illustrates how both can perceive the illusion, dilution, and potential loss of control and ownership of content in the GenAI era.

For much of the past two decades, a debate has dominated research on bilingualism and cognition: do bilingual individuals have a cognitive advantage over monolinguals and, if so, what is the source of this advantage? Previous proposals have posited that transfer is the source of this advantage. According to this proposal, there is some skill (i.e., inhibition) that is developed through the experience of being bilingual that then generalizes to nonlinguistic tasks requiring the same skill. For instance, bilinguals with better inhibition skills would perform better in general domain tasks that require inhibition (e.g., choosing the correct answer among competing, distracting possibilities [1]).

The possibility that bilingualism could impact cognitive ability began with research with children [1], but others reported that bilingual middle-aged and older adults outperformed their counterparts on a Simon task commonly used to investigate attention and perception [2]. These results suggested there could be broader implications for bilingualism than had been previously considered. The paper was followed by many replication attempts comparing monolingual and bilingual adults performing executive function tasks, but no simple relation between bilingualism and performance was found [3].

Recent human intracerebral recordings reveal that frontoparietal circuits linked by the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) have critical, hemisphere-asymmetric contributions to conscious perception. Right-hemisphere networks are crucial for attention-based prioritization of information; left-hemisphere regions contribute to perceptual decisions and model building. These asymmetries confirm and specify clinical evidence from neglect patients.

Hippocampal place cells that encode the spatial location of an individual during navigation are widely reported in rodents. However, studies in primates have instead reported hippocampal cells that encode views of the environment. Evolutionary adaptations for navigating during night and day may explain the divergence of hippocampal representations between species.

Cognitive neuroscience has converged on a definition of working memory (WM) as a capacity-limited system that maintains highly accessible representations via stimulus-specific neural patterns. We argue that this standard definition may be incomplete. We highlight the fundamental need to recognize specific instances or tokens and to bind those tokens to the surrounding context. We propose that contextual binding is supported by spatiotemporal ‘pointers’ and that pointers are the source of neural signals that track the number of stored items, independent of their content. These content-independent pointers may provide a productive perspective for understanding item-based capacity limits in WM and the role of WM as a gateway for long-term storage.

We discuss recent findings suggesting that non-human animals lack memory for stimulus sequences, and therefore do not represent the order of stimuli faithfully. These observations have far-reaching consequences for animal cognition, neuroscience, and studies of the evolution of language and culture. This is because, if non-human animals do not remember or process information about order faithfully, then it is unlikely that non-human animals perform mental simulations, construct mental world models, have episodic memory, or transmit culture faithfully. If this suggested sequence bottleneck proves to be a prevalent characteristic of animal memory systems, as suggested by recent work, it would require a re-examination of some influential concepts and ideas.

Creative problem solving and memory are inherently intertwined: memory accesses existing knowledge while creativity enhances it. Recent studies show that insights often accompanying creative solutions enhance long-term memory. This insight memory advantage (IMA) is explained by the 'insight as prediction error (PE)' hypothesis which states that insights arise from PEs updating predictive solution models and thereby enhancing memory. Neurally, the hippocampus initially detects PEs and then, together with the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), integrates and updates these expectations facilitating efficient memory encoding and retrieval. Dopamine (DA) mediates reward PEs and long-term potentiation (LTP) in the hippocampus, while noradrenaline (NE) enhances arousal and attention impacting the amygdala, the salience network, and hippocampal plasticity. These neurobiological mechanisms likely underpin IMA and have significant implications for educational practices and problem-solving strategies.

How does social cognition help us communicate through language? At what levels does this interaction occur? In classical views, social cognition is independent of language, and integrating the two can be slow, effortful, and error-prone. But new research into word level processes reveals that communication is brimming with social micro-processes that happen in real time, guiding even the simplest choices like how we use adjectives, articles, and demonstratives. We interpret these findings in the context of advances in theoretical models of social cognition and propose a communicative mind-tracking framework, where social micro-processes are not a secondary process in how we use language – they are fundamental to how communication works.

Cognition arises from neural operations at multiple spatial scales, from individual neurons to large-scale networks. Despite extensive research on coding principles and emergent cognitive processes across brain areas, investigation across scales has been limited. Here, we propose ways to test the idea that different cognitive processes emerge from distinct information coding principles at various scales, which collectively give rise to complex behavior. This approach involves comparing brain–behavior associations and the underlying neural geometry across scales, alongside an investigation of global and local scale interactions. Bridging findings across species and techniques through open science and collaborations is essential to comprehensively understand the multiscale brain and its functions.

As we navigate through the day, our attentional control processes are constantly challenged by changing sensory information, goals, expectations, and motivations. At the same time, our bodies and brains are impacted by changes in global physiological state that can influence attentional processes. Based on converging lines of evidence from brain recordings in physically active humans and non‐humans, we propose a new framework incorporating at least two physically activated modes of attentional control in humans: altered gain control and differential neuromodulation of control networks. We discuss the implications of this framework for understanding a broader range of states and cognitive functions studied both in the laboratory and in the wild.

People worldwide tend to believe that their societies are more meritocratic than they actually are. We propose the belief in meritocracy is widespread because it is rooted in simple, seemingly obvious causal–explanatory intuitions. Our proposal suggests solutions for debunking the myth of meritocracy and increasing support for equity-oriented policies.

Understanding what conscious experiences feel like from a first-person perspective, known as the hard problem of consciousness, remains one of the most intriguing yet elusive topics in science and philosophy [1,2]. In their timely article in TiCS, Fleming and Shea propose the quality space approach as a promising path forward [3]. They suggest that the qualitative nature of consciousness can be studied by correlating the subjective similarity between stimulus-evoked conscious experiences with the similarity in neural activity patterns.

In their recent opinion article [1], Fleming and Shea explore how different theories of consciousness fare in accounting for the structure of our phenomenology. Under the quality space hypothesis, each experience corresponds to a point in a multidimensional space instantiated over the activity of processing units (i.e., natural or artificial neurons). This way of thinking about representation is familiar to connectionists [2] and it is indeed radically different from the hypothesis that mental representation always involves symbolic propositions.

Our hope and aim with our recent article in TiCS [1] was to provoke debate and research on the hypothesis that conscious experiences form quality spaces; thus, we were very pleased to receive letters from Dołęga, et al. [2] and Song [3] making constructive suggestions for taking this enquiry in new directions. Our focus was on how various computational theories of consciousness can accommodate the quality space hypothesis. Dołęga et al. make the helpful observation that this should also be investigated diachronically, both developmentally and during learning [2].

Ambient noise disrupts vocal communication amongst animals. Recent studies show that some species, such as marmosets, can rapidly adjust the patterns of ongoing calls according to noisy environments. This substantial vocal flexibility reveals that non-human primates have more advanced cognitive control over when and what to vocalize than previously thought.

Lateralization is a defining characteristic of the human brain, often studied through localized approaches that focus on interhemispheric differences between homologous pairs of regions. It is also important to emphasize an integrative perspective of global brain asymmetry, in which hemispheric differences are understood through global patterns across the entire brain.