Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) reshapes and challenges psychological ownership of created content. This article examines how GenAI disrupts original content creators’ and GenAI users’ sense of ownership and control and illustrates how both can perceive the illusion, dilution, and potential loss of control and ownership of content in the GenAI era.

For much of the past two decades, a debate has dominated research on bilingualism and cognition: do bilingual individuals have a cognitive advantage over monolinguals and, if so, what is the source of this advantage? Previous proposals have posited that transfer is the source of this advantage. According to this proposal, there is some skill (i.e., inhibition) that is developed through the experience of being bilingual that then generalizes to nonlinguistic tasks requiring the same skill. For instance, bilinguals with better inhibition skills would perform better in general domain tasks that require inhibition (e.g., choosing the correct answer among competing, distracting possibilities [1]).

The possibility that bilingualism could impact cognitive ability began with research with children [1], but others reported that bilingual middle-aged and older adults outperformed their counterparts on a Simon task commonly used to investigate attention and perception [2]. These results suggested there could be broader implications for bilingualism than had been previously considered. The paper was followed by many replication attempts comparing monolingual and bilingual adults performing executive function tasks, but no simple relation between bilingualism and performance was found [3].

Recent human intracerebral recordings reveal that frontoparietal circuits linked by the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) have critical, hemisphere-asymmetric contributions to conscious perception. Right-hemisphere networks are crucial for attention-based prioritization of information; left-hemisphere regions contribute to perceptual decisions and model building. These asymmetries confirm and specify clinical evidence from neglect patients.

Hippocampal place cells that encode the spatial location of an individual during navigation are widely reported in rodents. However, studies in primates have instead reported hippocampal cells that encode views of the environment. Evolutionary adaptations for navigating during night and day may explain the divergence of hippocampal representations between species.

Cognitive neuroscience has converged on a definition of working memory (WM) as a capacity-limited system that maintains highly accessible representations via stimulus-specific neural patterns. We argue that this standard definition may be incomplete. We highlight the fundamental need to recognize specific instances or tokens and to bind those tokens to the surrounding context. We propose that contextual binding is supported by spatiotemporal ‘pointers’ and that pointers are the source of neural signals that track the number of stored items, independent of their content. These content-independent pointers may provide a productive perspective for understanding item-based capacity limits in WM and the role of WM as a gateway for long-term storage.

We discuss recent findings suggesting that non-human animals lack memory for stimulus sequences, and therefore do not represent the order of stimuli faithfully. These observations have far-reaching consequences for animal cognition, neuroscience, and studies of the evolution of language and culture. This is because, if non-human animals do not remember or process information about order faithfully, then it is unlikely that non-human animals perform mental simulations, construct mental world models, have episodic memory, or transmit culture faithfully. If this suggested sequence bottleneck proves to be a prevalent characteristic of animal memory systems, as suggested by recent work, it would require a re-examination of some influential concepts and ideas.

Creative problem solving and memory are inherently intertwined: memory accesses existing knowledge while creativity enhances it. Recent studies show that insights often accompanying creative solutions enhance long-term memory. This insight memory advantage (IMA) is explained by the 'insight as prediction error (PE)' hypothesis which states that insights arise from PEs updating predictive solution models and thereby enhancing memory. Neurally, the hippocampus initially detects PEs and then, together with the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), integrates and updates these expectations facilitating efficient memory encoding and retrieval. Dopamine (DA) mediates reward PEs and long-term potentiation (LTP) in the hippocampus, while noradrenaline (NE) enhances arousal and attention impacting the amygdala, the salience network, and hippocampal plasticity. These neurobiological mechanisms likely underpin IMA and have significant implications for educational practices and problem-solving strategies.

How does social cognition help us communicate through language? At what levels does this interaction occur? In classical views, social cognition is independent of language, and integrating the two can be slow, effortful, and error-prone. But new research into word level processes reveals that communication is brimming with social micro-processes that happen in real time, guiding even the simplest choices like how we use adjectives, articles, and demonstratives. We interpret these findings in the context of advances in theoretical models of social cognition and propose a communicative mind-tracking framework, where social micro-processes are not a secondary process in how we use language – they are fundamental to how communication works.

Cognition arises from neural operations at multiple spatial scales, from individual neurons to large-scale networks. Despite extensive research on coding principles and emergent cognitive processes across brain areas, investigation across scales has been limited. Here, we propose ways to test the idea that different cognitive processes emerge from distinct information coding principles at various scales, which collectively give rise to complex behavior. This approach involves comparing brain–behavior associations and the underlying neural geometry across scales, alongside an investigation of global and local scale interactions. Bridging findings across species and techniques through open science and collaborations is essential to comprehensively understand the multiscale brain and its functions.

As we navigate through the day, our attentional control processes are constantly challenged by changing sensory information, goals, expectations, and motivations. At the same time, our bodies and brains are impacted by changes in global physiological state that can influence attentional processes. Based on converging lines of evidence from brain recordings in physically active humans and non‐humans, we propose a new framework incorporating at least two physically activated modes of attentional control in humans: altered gain control and differential neuromodulation of control networks. We discuss the implications of this framework for understanding a broader range of states and cognitive functions studied both in the laboratory and in the wild.

People worldwide tend to believe that their societies are more meritocratic than they actually are. We propose the belief in meritocracy is widespread because it is rooted in simple, seemingly obvious causal–explanatory intuitions. Our proposal suggests solutions for debunking the myth of meritocracy and increasing support for equity-oriented policies.

Understanding what conscious experiences feel like from a first-person perspective, known as the hard problem of consciousness, remains one of the most intriguing yet elusive topics in science and philosophy [1,2]. In their timely article in TiCS, Fleming and Shea propose the quality space approach as a promising path forward [3]. They suggest that the qualitative nature of consciousness can be studied by correlating the subjective similarity between stimulus-evoked conscious experiences with the similarity in neural activity patterns.

In their recent opinion article [1], Fleming and Shea explore how different theories of consciousness fare in accounting for the structure of our phenomenology. Under the quality space hypothesis, each experience corresponds to a point in a multidimensional space instantiated over the activity of processing units (i.e., natural or artificial neurons). This way of thinking about representation is familiar to connectionists [2] and it is indeed radically different from the hypothesis that mental representation always involves symbolic propositions.

Our hope and aim with our recent article in TiCS [1] was to provoke debate and research on the hypothesis that conscious experiences form quality spaces; thus, we were very pleased to receive letters from Dołęga, et al. [2] and Song [3] making constructive suggestions for taking this enquiry in new directions. Our focus was on how various computational theories of consciousness can accommodate the quality space hypothesis. Dołęga et al. make the helpful observation that this should also be investigated diachronically, both developmentally and during learning [2].

Ambient noise disrupts vocal communication amongst animals. Recent studies show that some species, such as marmosets, can rapidly adjust the patterns of ongoing calls according to noisy environments. This substantial vocal flexibility reveals that non-human primates have more advanced cognitive control over when and what to vocalize than previously thought.

Lateralization is a defining characteristic of the human brain, often studied through localized approaches that focus on interhemispheric differences between homologous pairs of regions. It is also important to emphasize an integrative perspective of global brain asymmetry, in which hemispheric differences are understood through global patterns across the entire brain.

Clinicians have suggested but not shown how anxiety involves altered planning. Here, I synthesize and extend computational models of planning in a framework that can be used to explain planning biases in anxiety. To spur its development, I spotlight two of its promising areas: task construal and meta-control.

Generic language, that is, language that refers to a category as an abstract whole (e.g., ‘Girls like pink’) rather than specific individuals (e.g., ‘This girl likes pink’), is a common means by which children learn about social kinds. Here, we propose that children interpret generics as signaling that their referenced categories are natural, objective, and have distinctive features, and, thus, in the social domain, that such language affects children’s beliefs about the social world in ways that extend far beyond the content they explicitly communicate. On this account, even generics expressing uncontentious content (e.g., ‘Girls are great at math’) can lead children to think of categories as defining fundamentally distinct kinds of people and contribute to the development of stereotypes and other problematic social phenomena.

How do the two main types of neural dynamics, aperiodic transients and oscillations, contribute to the interactions between feedforward (FF) and feedback (FB) pathways in sensory inference and predictive processing? We discuss three theoretical perspectives. First, we critically evaluate the theory that gamma and alpha/beta rhythms play a role in classic hierarchical predictive coding (HPC) by mediating FF and FB communication, respectively. Second, we outline an alternative functional model in which rapid sensory inference is mediated by aperiodic transients, whereas oscillations contribute to the stabilization of neural representations over time and plasticity processes. Third, we propose that the strong dependence of oscillations on predictability can be explained based on a biologically plausible alternative to classic HPC, namely dendritic HPC.

Work on the psychology of justice has largely focused on punishment. However, punishment is not our only strategy for dealing with conflict. Rather, emerging work suggests that people often respond to transgressions by compensating victims, involving third-party mediators, and engaging in forgiveness. These responses are linked in that they are involved in more restorative than retributive justice practices: they center victims as well as (or instead of) perpetrators and can help repair fractured relationships. Work with non-human animals echoes these findings: reconciliation and intervention by third parties play a key role in conflict management across taxa. In this review, we focus on these restorative interventions, with the aim of painting a more complete picture of the psychology of justice.

Predicting individual behavioral traits from brain idiosyncrasies has broad practical implications, yet predictions vary widely. This constraint may be driven by a combination of signal and noise in both brain and behavioral variables. Here, we expand on this idea, highlighting the potential of extended sampling ‘precision’ studies. First, we discuss their relevance to improving the reliability of individualized estimates by minimizing measurement noise. Second, we review how targeted within-subject experiments, when combined with individualized analysis or modeling frameworks, can maximize signal. These improvements in signal-to-noise facilitated by precision designs can help boost prediction studies. We close by discussing the integration of precision approaches with large-sample consortia studies to leverage the advantages of both.

Structured internal representations (‘cognitive maps’) shape cognition, from imagining the future and counterfactual past, to transferring knowledge to new settings. Our understanding of how such representations are formed and maintained in biological and artificial neural networks has grown enormously. The cognitive mapping hypothesis of schizophrenia extends this enquiry to psychiatry, proposing that diverse symptoms – from delusions to conceptual disorganization – stem from abnormalities in how the brain forms structured representations. These abnormalities may arise from a confluence of neurophysiological perturbations [excitation-inhibition (E/I) imbalance, resulting in attractor instability and impaired representational capacity] and/or environmental factors such as early life psychosocial stressors (which impinge on representation learning). This proposal thus links knowledge of neural circuit abnormalities, environmental risk factors, and symptoms.

From rising disparities in income to limited socio-political representation for minority groups, inequality is a topic of perennial interest for contemporary society. Research in the evolutionary sciences has started to investigate how social structure allows inequality to evolve, but is developing in silo from existing work in the social and cognitive sciences. I synthesise these literatures to present a theoretical framework of how and why cultural and ecological conditions can create social structure that either produces or constrains inequality. According to this framework, such conditions dictate the costs and benefits of cooperation that shape individuals’ social preferences and resulting behaviours. These behaviours aggregate to produce distinct structures of a society’s social networks, which generate different levels of inequality observed across societies.

Science progresses when ideas clash, leaving the most successful to survive and move us closer to the truth. In this ideal hypothetico-deductive approach [1], science is dynamic and fluid, with theories constantly tested and replaced. In reality, however, many opposing theories rarely meet. Scientists instead often work in entrenched paradigms or research programs – focused on their own frameworks, language, and methods – which resist direct comparison and evolve incrementally at a generational timescale rather than through confrontations [2,3].

The 4-day working week is gaining interest, with international trials reporting enhanced staff wellbeing and performance, despite spending less time on the job. Here, we argue that improved performance on a 4-day working week arises through two psychological mechanisms of recovery and motivation: because better rested, better motivated brains, create better work.

In a recent article in TiCS [1], Zeman provided a masterful and balanced review of aphantasia. However, in doing so, he might have been too generous to some accounts. Specifically, unlike Zeman, we consider the view that aphantasia involves nonconscious imagistic representations [2] to be clearly superior to other views. Here, we argue against these other views as they were described by Zeman. In addition, we address some additional arguments that have been raised to counter the idea that aphantasia involves nonconscious imagistic representations [3], which were not addressed by Zeman in his review.

Earlier research has established strong evidence for structural brain changes across pregnancy. Pritschet et al. now enhanced our understanding of pregnancy-induced brain plasticity by following one woman throughout her pregnancy and the postpartum period, revealing insights into the dynamics of grey and white matter alterations across the transition to motherhood.

Children approach language by learning parts and constructing wholes. But they can also first learn wholes and then discover parts. We demonstrate this understudied yet impactful process in children creating language without input. Whole-to-part learning thus need not be driven by hard-to-segment input and is a bias that children bring to language.

The study of intellectual humility (IH), which is gaining increasing interest among cognitive scientists, has been dominated by a focus on individuals. We propose that IH operates at the collective level as the tendency of a collective’s members to attend to each other’s intellectual limitations and the limitations of their collective cognitive efforts. Given people’s propensity to better recognize others’ limitations than their own, IH may be more readily achievable in collectives than individuals. We describe the socio-cognitive dynamics that can interfere with collective IH and offer the solution of building intellectually humbling environments that create a culture of IH that can outlast the given membership of a collective. We conclude with promising research directions.

‘Cellular psychology’ is a new field of inquiry that studies dendritic mechanisms for adapting mental events to the current context, thus increasing their coherence, flexibility, effectiveness, and comprehensibility. Apical dendrites of neocortical pyramidal cells have a crucial role in cognition – those dendrites receive input from diverse sources, including feedback, and can amplify the cell’s feedforward transmission if relevant in that context. Specialized subsets of inhibitory interneurons regulate this cooperative context-sensitive processing by increasing or decreasing amplification. Apical input has different effects on cellular output depending on whether we are awake, deeply asleep, or dreaming. Furthermore, wakeful thought and imagery may depend on apical input. High-resolution neuroimaging in humans supports and complements evidence on these cellular mechanisms from other mammals.

Habits are the behavioral output of two brain systems. A stimulus–response (S–R) system that encourages us to efficiently repeat well-practiced actions in familiar settings, and a goal-directed system concerned with flexibility, prospection, and planning. Getting the balance between these systems right is crucial: an imbalance may leave people vulnerable to action slips, impulsive behaviors, and even compulsive behaviors. In this review we examine how recent advances in our understanding of these competing brain mechanisms can be harnessed to increase the control over both making and breaking habits. We discuss applications in everyday life, as well as validated and emergent interventions for clinical populations affected by the balance between these systems. As research in this area accelerates, we anticipate a rapid influx of new insights into intentional behavioral change and clinical interventions, including new opportunities for personalization of these interventions based on the neurobiology, environmental context, and personal preferences of an individual.

Pain, an indicator of potential tissue damage, ideally falls under individual control. Although previous work shows a trend towards reduced pain in contexts where pain is controllable, there is a large variability across studies that is probably related to different aspects of control. We therefore outline a taxonomy of different aspects of control relevant to pain, sketch how control over pain can be integrated into a Bayesian pain model, and suggest changes in expectations and their precision as potential mechanisms. We also highlight confounding cognitive factors, particularly predictability, that emphasize the necessity for careful experimental designs. Finally, we describe the neurobiological underpinnings of how control affects pain processing in studies using different types of control, and highlight the roles of the anterior insula, middle frontal gyrus (MFG), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).

Gender is important to the social and cognitive sciences, as evidenced by hundreds of meta-analyses, thousands of studies, and millions of datapoints that examine how gender (as an independent variable) shapes cognition and behavior. In this expansive literature, gender is often understood as a noun – a social category that separates ‘men’ from ‘women’. However, gender can also be studied and understood as a verb – a cognitive process used to conceptually divide both human and non-human entities by masculinity and femininity. In this review, we outline the cognitive process of gendering and propose a framework to understand gender as a verb that enables a better understanding of how gender operates, why it is important, and how it can change.

Despite decades of research, we lack objective diagnostic or prognostic biomarkers of mental health problems. A key reason for this limited progress is a reliance on the traditional case–control paradigm, which assumes that each disorder has a single cause that can be uncovered by comparing average phenotypic values of patient and control samples. Here, we discuss the problematic assumptions on which this paradigm is based and highlight recent efforts that seek to characterize, rather than minimize, the inherent clinical and biological variability that underpins psychiatric populations. Embracing such variability is necessary to understand pathophysiological mechanisms and develop more targeted and effective treatments.